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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2081 
___________ 
 
ROSS A. FIORANI, STATES ATTORNEY GENERALS IN: CA, 
OH, PA, MD, WVA, DE, NJ, NY TN NC, SC AND FL, 
    
v. 
 
CHRYSLER GROUP; DODGE CORP; TD FINANCIAL 
GROUP, LLC; ALLY FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
ROSS A. FIORANI,  
                                   Appellant  
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-00416) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 3, 2013 
Before:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 17, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
2 
 
 Ross A. Fiorani, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from an order 
of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania sua sponte 
dismissing his complaint with prejudice for lack of venue as well as for being frivolous 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1).  For the following reasons, we will vacate the 
District Court’s dismissal order and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  In April 2010, Fiorani, a frequent litigator in federal court, filed a pro 
se complaint against the Chrysler-Dodge Corporation, alleging various violations of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, 
along with other federal and state law violations.  (Fiorani v. Chrysler-Dodge Corp., 
M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1:10-cv-00880.)  On August 9, 2010, a Magistrate Judge 
recommended that Fiorani’s complaint be transferred to the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia because a substantial number of the events giving rise 
to his claims had occurred within that district.  The Magistrate Judge also recommended 
that Fiorani’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis be held in abeyance to be reviewed by 
the Eastern District of Virginia.  On August 30, 2010, the District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and ordered that Fiorani’s case be transferred to the 
Eastern District of Virginia.
1
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 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia subsequently denied 
Fiorani’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 
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 On March 6, 2012, Fiorani filed a pro se complaint against the Chrysler Group, 
Dodge Corporation, TD Financial Group, and Ally Financial Services, alleging violations 
of RICO as well as various other federal and state laws.  Fiorani’s complaint alleged that 
Appellees were participating in a conspiracy to force all potential purchasers of Chrysler-
Dodge vehicles to obtain financing through the defendant financial institutions.  Fiorani 
further alleged that he was prevented from purchasing a Dodge Charger R/T despite a 
contract he allegedly had entered into with Chrysler-Dodge and Chrysler-Financial which 
authorized prearranged and pre-approved credit for the purchase.  On March 16, 2012, a 
Magistrate Judge recommended that Fiorani’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice.  On 
April 5, 2012, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and 
dismissed Fiorani’s complaint with prejudice on the grounds that (1) the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania was an improper venue and (2) it was frivolous because the District 
Court had previously advised Fiorani that the Middle District of Pennsylvania was not a 
proper venue. 
 Fiorani timely filed this appeal.  The Clerk notified him that his appeal would be 
submitted to the Court for possible summary action under 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6.  However, the Clerk later issued a briefing schedule and directed the parties to brief 
whether the District Court erred in sua sponte dismissing Fiorani’s complaint with 
                                                                                                                                                  
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.  (Fiorani v. Chrysler-Dodge Corp., 
E.D. Va. Civ. No. 1:10-cv-00989, Docket #15.) 
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prejudice because of improper venue, and whether improper venue is a proper ground for 
finding a complaint frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 
II. 
 We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s dismissal of the complaint as frivolous is for abuse of discretion, see Denton v. 
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1992), but we exercise plenary review over its 
application of law, see Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995).  A 
claim is frivolous if “the claim is of little or no weight, value or importance, not worthy 
of serious consideration, or trivial.”  Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1089.  Improper sua sponte 
dismissals for venue are reviewed for harmless error.  See Buchanan v. Manley, 145 F.3d 
386, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
III. 
 Under RICO, venue lies “in the district court . . . for any district in which [any 
defendant] resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.”  18 U.S.C. § 1965(a).  
However, venue over RICO claims is controlled by both 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) and the 
general venue provisions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1391.  In a civil action, venue is 
proper: 
only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants 
reside in the same state, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of 
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial 
part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial 
district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which 
the action may otherwise be brought. 
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28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). 
 Fiorani’s complaint neither sets forth facts indicating that any defendant is located 
in the Middle District of Pennsylvania nor alleges that any of the events or omissions 
giving rise to his claims occurred there.  As the District Court notes, the only mention 
Fiorani makes of Pennsylvania is to indicate that Mid-Atlantic Regional Dodge, a non-
defendant, is located in Malvern, Pennsylvania.  However, Malvern’s location in Chester 
County places it within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
 District courts generally should not dismiss in forma pauperis complaints for 
improper venue.  As we have previously explained,  
28 U.S.C. § 1915 contains no express authorization for a dismissal for lack 
of venue.  In the absence of any such statutory authority, it is inappropriate 
for the trial court to dispose of the case sua sponte on an objection to the 
complaint which would be waived if not raised by the defendant(s) in a 
timely manner. 
 
Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. 
Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A district court may not dismiss a case sua 
sponte for improper venue absent extraordinary circumstances.”).  Here, the District 
Court raised the issue of venue sua sponte without expressly considering whether the 
interests of justice weigh in favor of transferring Fiorani’s complaint instead of 
dismissing it.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).  The District Court erred in doing so. 
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 Under the circumstances presented here, the District Court’s error was not 
harmless.  See Buchanan, 145 F.3d at 388.
2
  Fiorani’s complaint makes it abundantly 
clear that there is no conceivable basis for venue in the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
because none of the defendants is alleged to reside there and because his allegations are 
not related in any way to that District.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a). 
While some of Fiorani’s claims are duplicitous of claims contained in his prior complaint 
that was dismissed by the Eastern District of Virginia, the District Court’s dismissal of 
his complaint with prejudice precludes Fiorani from refiling his new allegations in the 
proper venue.  As we have previously noted, dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate 
in limited circumstances not applicable here.  Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 
(3d Cir. 2002); Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). 
IV. 
 In sum, the District Court erred by sua sponte dismissing with prejudice Fiorani’s 
complaint for improper venue, and such error was not harmless.  Accordingly, we will 
vacate the District Court’s dismissal order and remand the matter for further proceedings. 
                                              
2
 The Buchanan court affirmed a dismissal for improper venue, concluding that “such 
procedural error is harmless in cases where, as here, the appellant has had an opportunity 
to challenge the district court’s ruling on appeal but has failed to demonstrate that venue 
is proper.”  Buchanan, 145 F.3d at 388.  However, the district court had dismissed 
Buchanan’s complaint without prejudice.  See id. at 387.  While Fiorani has challenged 
the District Court’s ruling on appeal, we focus on the fact that, unlike in Buchanan, the 
District Court dismissed his complaint with prejudice, foreclosing him from filing his 
new allegations in the proper venue. 
